You could argue that the ladder was alluring them...LongTimeCatFan said:UMGriz75 said:The State argued, in the Kaarma case, that leaving the garage door open at night was an "invitation" and "entrapment" that by leaving his premises open to the public, he was creating a scenario likely to invite trespass by ignorant young people out on a lark.LongTimeCatFan said:If the homeowner went out to confront them and one of the dudes made a move that made the man feel like his life was in jeopardy, he could have used lethal force legally due to the disparity of force. There was no disparity of force in the Kaarma case.
This situation and the Kaarma situation have very little in common other than both originate with criminal trespass.
Kaarma argued that when he went outside, he could not see into the garage, knew that someone was in there, and was afraid that the intruder, who was clearly "on the premises," was armed, and that he felt threatened in particular because of repeated intrusions and that the intruder knew that Kaarma was standing there.
The motive -- "stealing beer" -- was not a defense to murder, neither was the fact that the intruder was on the premises, inside a structure, in the dark, admittedly committing at least one crime. The State's argument -- that leaving the premises open to the public at night was an "invitation" -- offers a problematic argument, to get a conviction in that case.
Ummmm..... I think that one goes to reasonableness. Does a reasonable person set a trap to shoot someone as Kaarma did? It's as simple as that.
In this case, there was no intent on alluring an intruder. It would be reasonable to confront them.
SeattleBobcat said:You could argue that the ladder was alluring them...LongTimeCatFan said:UMGriz75 said:The State argued, in the Kaarma case, that leaving the garage door open at night was an "invitation" and "entrapment" that by leaving his premises open to the public, he was creating a scenario likely to invite trespass by ignorant young people out on a lark.LongTimeCatFan said:If the homeowner went out to confront them and one of the dudes made a move that made the man feel like his life was in jeopardy, he could have used lethal force legally due to the disparity of force. There was no disparity of force in the Kaarma case.
This situation and the Kaarma situation have very little in common other than both originate with criminal trespass.
Kaarma argued that when he went outside, he could not see into the garage, knew that someone was in there, and was afraid that the intruder, who was clearly "on the premises," was armed, and that he felt threatened in particular because of repeated intrusions and that the intruder knew that Kaarma was standing there.
The motive -- "stealing beer" -- was not a defense to murder, neither was the fact that the intruder was on the premises, inside a structure, in the dark, admittedly committing at least one crime. The State's argument -- that leaving the premises open to the public at night was an "invitation" -- offers a problematic argument, to get a conviction in that case.
Ummmm..... I think that one goes to reasonableness. Does a reasonable person set a trap to shoot someone as Kaarma did? It's as simple as that.
In this case, there was no intent on alluring an intruder. It would be reasonable to confront them.
That's the point. In Kaarma, the State argued that the trespass was encouraged, that the trespasser would naturally be lured in to investigate by leaving the premises open. Of course Kaarma was claiming that his family had been "traumatized" several times by the known invasions of their family premises, fully occupied premises, to which the sheriff's office had never responded in a serious manner. There, the State argued that trespass is WHAT YOUNG PEOPLE NATURALLY DO WHEN YOU LEAVE YOUR PREMISES OPEN TO THE PUBLIC AT NIGHT.LongTimeCatFan said:Ummmm..... I think that one goes to reasonableness. Does a reasonable person set a trap to shoot someone as Kaarma did? It's as simple as that.
You keep stumbling over the same point: there was no criminal intent on the part of the UM students. None. On the other hand, using the State's argument in Kaarma, leaving the garage door open was at least a negligent act on Kaarma's part because it offered the opportunity to random teenagers to enter the premises. The fact that it was, in fact, an intentional act only took advantage, the State argued, of the natural inclination of random teens to "explore." His premises would not have been subject to a trespass invasion if he had simply secured the premises, and so he could not "blame the teens" nor was it any justification whatsoever for shooting one of them.LongTimeCatFan said:The intent wasn't there
No, it proves that common sense, in the hands of those that have it, goes a long ways to understanding these circumstances.HelenaHandBasket said:Guess that makes it all good....nothing more to see here....
IdahoGrizFan said:This is long.....
can someone please send me an email when we find out if they are off the team? If not now many games will they miss. That is all I want to know.
Email me at: [email protected]
Thanks.
UMGriz75 said:No, it proves that common sense, in the hands of those that have it, goes a long ways to understanding these circumstances.HelenaHandBasket said:Guess that makes it all good....nothing more to see here....
Htowngriz said:IdahoGrizFan said:This is long.....
can someone please send me an email when we find out if they are off the team? If not now many games will they miss. That is all I want to know.
Email me at: [email protected]
Thanks.
Not only are they permabanned from the football team and the university, they shall be forced to wear red "T"s (for trespassers) on their chests for the rest of their days.
UMGriz75 said:You keep stumbling over the same point: there was no criminal intent on the part of the UM students. None. On the other hand, using the State's argument in Kaarma, leaving the garage door open was at least a negligent act on Kaarma's part because it offered the opportunity to random teenagers to enter the premises. The fact that it was, in fact, an intentional act only took advantage, the State argued, of the natural inclination of random teens to "explore." His premises would not have been subject to a trespass invasion if he had simply secured the premises, and so he could not "blame the teens" nor was it any justification whatsoever for shooting one of them.LongTimeCatFan said:The intent wasn't there
br fan said:Montana's criminal code is unique in that there is no such thing as "criminal intent" or "mens rea." In Montana the only mental state necessary is to knowingly, purposely or negligently commit the act. No evil or unlawful purpose is needed.
Montana's trespass statute has a "knowing" requirement.45-2-103. General requirements of criminal act and mental state. (1) Except for deliberate homicide as defined in 45-5-102(1)(b) or an offense that involves absolute liability, a person is not guilty of an offense unless, with respect to each element described by the statute defining the offense, a person acts while having one of the mental states of knowingly, negligently, or purposely.
(3) The existence of a mental state may be inferred from the acts of the accused and the facts and circumstances connected with the offense.
(4) If the statute defining an offense prescribes a particular mental state with respect to the offense as a whole without distinguishing among the elements of the offense, the prescribed mental state applies to each element.
(5) Knowledge that certain conduct constitutes an offense or knowledge of the existence, meaning, or application of the statute defining an offense is not an element of the offense unless the statute clearly defines it as an element.
That's "mens rea."Based on the Montana Supreme Court decisions in State v. Rothacher, 272 Mont. 303, 901 P.2d 82 (1995); State v. Lambert, 280 Mont. 231, 929 P.2d 846 (1996); and State v. Patton , 280 Mont. 278, 930 P.2d 635 (1996); the Commission believes that it is no longer acceptable to instruct on the mental states of purposely or knowingly by listing each of the alternative subsections, thus allowing the jury to select that which it believes is most applicable. If the crime is a “result” oriented crime, you should define the mental state with the subsection that relates to a result. For example, if the crime is deliberate homicide, purposely should be defined as: "...a person acts purposely with respect to a result if it is the person's conscious object to cause that result." Likewise, in the same situation, knowingly should be defined as: “A person acts knowingly with respect to the result of conduct described by a statute defining an offense when the person is aware that it is highly probable that the result will be caused by the person's conduct."
Mens rea is a legal phrase used to describe the mental state a person must be in while committing a crime for it to be intentional. It can refer to a general intent to break the law or a specific, premeditated plan to commit a particular offense.
UMGriz75 said:br fan said:Montana's criminal code is unique in that there is no such thing as "criminal intent" or "mens rea." In Montana the only mental state necessary is to knowingly, purposely or negligently commit the act. No evil or unlawful purpose is needed.Montana's trespass statute has a "knowing" requirement.45-2-103. General requirements of criminal act and mental state. (1) Except for deliberate homicide as defined in 45-5-102(1)(b) or an offense that involves absolute liability, a person is not guilty of an offense unless, with respect to each element described by the statute defining the offense, a person acts while having one of the mental states of knowingly, negligently, or purposely.
(3) The existence of a mental state may be inferred from the acts of the accused and the facts and circumstances connected with the offense.
(4) If the statute defining an offense prescribes a particular mental state with respect to the offense as a whole without distinguishing among the elements of the offense, the prescribed mental state applies to each element.
(5) Knowledge that certain conduct constitutes an offense or knowledge of the existence, meaning, or application of the statute defining an offense is not an element of the offense unless the statute clearly defines it as an element.
Montana Criminal Jury Instruction # 2-104:
[Knowingly] A person acts knowingly: [when the person is aware of his or her conduct] OR [with respect to a specific circumstance defined by an offense, when the person is aware of that circumstance.]
That's "mens rea."Based on the Montana Supreme Court decisions in State v. Rothacher, 272 Mont. 303, 901 P.2d 82 (1995); State v. Lambert, 280 Mont. 231, 929 P.2d 846 (1996); and State v. Patton , 280 Mont. 278, 930 P.2d 635 (1996); the Commission believes that it is no longer acceptable to instruct on the mental states of purposely or knowingly by listing each of the alternative subsections, thus allowing the jury to select that which it believes is most applicable. If the crime is a “result” oriented crime, you should define the mental state with the subsection that relates to a result. For example, if the crime is deliberate homicide, purposely should be defined as: "...a person acts purposely with respect to a result if it is the person's conscious object to cause that result." Likewise, in the same situation, knowingly should be defined as: “A person acts knowingly with respect to the result of conduct described by a statute defining an offense when the person is aware that it is highly probable that the result will be caused by the person's conduct."
Mens rea is a legal phrase used to describe the mental state a person must be in while committing a crime for it to be intentional. It can refer to a general intent to break the law or a specific, premeditated plan to commit a particular offense.