Tailbone
Well-known member
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Stitt (istics)
Of all the 4th-and-1 attempts between 2000-2012 (NFL), 56.8 percent have been attempted inside opponent territory compared to 43.2 percent inside your own territory.
• In opponent territory, teams go for it on fourth down 61.87 percent of the time, and convert 64.69 percent.
• Inside their own territory, teams go for it on fourth down 15.77 percent of the time, and convert 67.21 percent.
If teams convert just as well, if not better, inside their own territory on 4th and 1, why not go for it more often? But of course, that involves a lot more risk, and we know coaches hate risk.
• From 2000 to 2010, coaches went for it on 4th and 1 inside their own territory 16.16 percent of the time, and converted 66.36 percent.
• Since 2011, coaches have gone for it on 4th and 1 inside their own territory 13.25 percent of the time, and converted 73.81 percent.
Even though teams are 31 of 42 – really should be 31 of 40 (77.5 percent) when you exclude kneel downs.
Going back and removing all kneel downs or intentional safeties at the end of the game on fourth down would only enhance the conversion rate, which tells us teams should be going for it on fourth down more often.
coaches are more than ever limiting their chances for success by not allowing them to stay on the field, even in the most common situations (4th and 1).
These are risks, but they are calculated risks. The numbers are predictive, though you should apply them to your team’s strengths (pass vs run). But regardless of your offensive philosophy, if you cannot trust your team to gain one yard when they need it most, then what does that say about you and your team? What are you saying to your team by punting (or opting for a FG)?
FWIW: In 2015 even Idaho has a 4th down conversion rate of 64.3% (at the time of the article from which this statistic was taken).
The Odds
A simple way to look at fourth downs is basic success rate. According to AdvancedNFLStats.com, from 2002-2008, teams generally hovered around the 50/50 mark when going for it on fourth down:
As a result, coaches viewed a fourth down attempt as a coin flip at best, and the idea of kicking (either a punt or a field goal) went largely unchallenged—that is, until Cal-Berkeley professor, David Roemer, challenged the long-standing tradition in 2005.
With the use of his formulas, here is what Roemer found:
• A team facing fourth-and-goal within five yards of the end zone is better off, on average, trying for a touchdown.
• At midfield, on average, there is an argument to go for any fourth down within five yards of a first down.
• Even on its own 10-yard-line -- 90 yards from the end zone -- a team within three yards of a first down is marginally better off, on average, going for it.
Brian Burke of AdvancedFootballStats.com has developed his own method of optimizing fourth down attempts.
Burke’s theory involves a metric he calls “expected points”, which varies based on field position. Predictably, a team’s expected points are much higher starting closer to the opponent’s end zone, and lower when backed-up in their own end.
In fact, expected points go into the negative when starting inside the 10, meaning the opposing team has a better chance of scoring than they do on their next possession.
With this formula, Burke has made a calculator http://wp.advancednflstats.com/4thdncalc1.php that will determine whether or not a fourth down attempt is warranted, based on the score, time remaining, field position and the yards needed to gain.
These stats don’t take into account the hundreds of things that can go wrong on any given play. Whether it is a bad snap, a lineman tipping off the running lane, a false start or a missed assignment, there are too many factors that go into such a high-stakes play to possibly quantify on a computer.
On these critical plays, nerves are high, hands get tight, feet get heavy and minds speed up. A routine block or catch suddenly carries immeasurable weight.
Sometimes (usually) the most difficult opponent to deal with isn’t across the line but between your ears. Going for it on 4th down often, helps to make the 4th down play more routine and less stressful – increasing the chances of success.
"It's easy to sit there and apply a formula, but it's not always the easiest thing to do.... because that one time it doesn't work could cost your team a football game, and that's the thing a head coach has to live with, not the professor”.
So, What Should Head Coaches Do?
As difficult as it may be for even the most old-fashioned coaches, ignoring this relatively new evidence of fourth-down success may have cost their teams many wins without even knowing it.
The truth is, teams are too hesitant when it comes to keeping the offense on the field on fourth downs. Coaches, by nature, are paranoid creatures that want to leave as little to chance as possible.
Bottom Line
In any endeavor, you win some and you lose some. Unfortunately, you may lose some you should win, but sometimes you win some you might otherwise lose. I like what Stitt is doing because statistically, it makes sense. It has the potential to be unsettling to the other team who can’t substitute, and has the potential to “light up the scoreboard like a pinball machine”. The plays are there! - as of yet, it’s execution that’s lacking. That will change!
With apologies to Argh! For lack of attribution.
Stitt (istics)
Of all the 4th-and-1 attempts between 2000-2012 (NFL), 56.8 percent have been attempted inside opponent territory compared to 43.2 percent inside your own territory.
• In opponent territory, teams go for it on fourth down 61.87 percent of the time, and convert 64.69 percent.
• Inside their own territory, teams go for it on fourth down 15.77 percent of the time, and convert 67.21 percent.
If teams convert just as well, if not better, inside their own territory on 4th and 1, why not go for it more often? But of course, that involves a lot more risk, and we know coaches hate risk.
• From 2000 to 2010, coaches went for it on 4th and 1 inside their own territory 16.16 percent of the time, and converted 66.36 percent.
• Since 2011, coaches have gone for it on 4th and 1 inside their own territory 13.25 percent of the time, and converted 73.81 percent.
Even though teams are 31 of 42 – really should be 31 of 40 (77.5 percent) when you exclude kneel downs.
Going back and removing all kneel downs or intentional safeties at the end of the game on fourth down would only enhance the conversion rate, which tells us teams should be going for it on fourth down more often.
coaches are more than ever limiting their chances for success by not allowing them to stay on the field, even in the most common situations (4th and 1).
These are risks, but they are calculated risks. The numbers are predictive, though you should apply them to your team’s strengths (pass vs run). But regardless of your offensive philosophy, if you cannot trust your team to gain one yard when they need it most, then what does that say about you and your team? What are you saying to your team by punting (or opting for a FG)?
FWIW: In 2015 even Idaho has a 4th down conversion rate of 64.3% (at the time of the article from which this statistic was taken).
The Odds
A simple way to look at fourth downs is basic success rate. According to AdvancedNFLStats.com, from 2002-2008, teams generally hovered around the 50/50 mark when going for it on fourth down:
As a result, coaches viewed a fourth down attempt as a coin flip at best, and the idea of kicking (either a punt or a field goal) went largely unchallenged—that is, until Cal-Berkeley professor, David Roemer, challenged the long-standing tradition in 2005.
With the use of his formulas, here is what Roemer found:
• A team facing fourth-and-goal within five yards of the end zone is better off, on average, trying for a touchdown.
• At midfield, on average, there is an argument to go for any fourth down within five yards of a first down.
• Even on its own 10-yard-line -- 90 yards from the end zone -- a team within three yards of a first down is marginally better off, on average, going for it.
Brian Burke of AdvancedFootballStats.com has developed his own method of optimizing fourth down attempts.
Burke’s theory involves a metric he calls “expected points”, which varies based on field position. Predictably, a team’s expected points are much higher starting closer to the opponent’s end zone, and lower when backed-up in their own end.
In fact, expected points go into the negative when starting inside the 10, meaning the opposing team has a better chance of scoring than they do on their next possession.
With this formula, Burke has made a calculator http://wp.advancednflstats.com/4thdncalc1.php that will determine whether or not a fourth down attempt is warranted, based on the score, time remaining, field position and the yards needed to gain.
These stats don’t take into account the hundreds of things that can go wrong on any given play. Whether it is a bad snap, a lineman tipping off the running lane, a false start or a missed assignment, there are too many factors that go into such a high-stakes play to possibly quantify on a computer.
On these critical plays, nerves are high, hands get tight, feet get heavy and minds speed up. A routine block or catch suddenly carries immeasurable weight.
Sometimes (usually) the most difficult opponent to deal with isn’t across the line but between your ears. Going for it on 4th down often, helps to make the 4th down play more routine and less stressful – increasing the chances of success.
"It's easy to sit there and apply a formula, but it's not always the easiest thing to do.... because that one time it doesn't work could cost your team a football game, and that's the thing a head coach has to live with, not the professor”.
So, What Should Head Coaches Do?
As difficult as it may be for even the most old-fashioned coaches, ignoring this relatively new evidence of fourth-down success may have cost their teams many wins without even knowing it.
The truth is, teams are too hesitant when it comes to keeping the offense on the field on fourth downs. Coaches, by nature, are paranoid creatures that want to leave as little to chance as possible.
Bottom Line
In any endeavor, you win some and you lose some. Unfortunately, you may lose some you should win, but sometimes you win some you might otherwise lose. I like what Stitt is doing because statistically, it makes sense. It has the potential to be unsettling to the other team who can’t substitute, and has the potential to “light up the scoreboard like a pinball machine”. The plays are there! - as of yet, it’s execution that’s lacking. That will change!
With apologies to Argh! For lack of attribution.
